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On the origin of intermediate effects
in clinical case recall
HENK G. SCHMIDT and HENNY P. A. BOSHUIZEN
University of Limburg, Maastricht, The Netherlands
In two experiments, the effects of level of medical expertise and study time on free recall of
a clinical case were assessed. In Experiment 1, a nonmonotonic relationship between level of ex-
pertise and recall was found: Subjects of intermediate levels of expertise remembered more in-
formation from the case than both experts and novices. This "intermediate effect" disappeared,
however, when study time was restricted. Analysis of post hoc acquired protocols ofpathophysio-
logical knowledge active during case processing suggested that this phenomenon could be at-
tributed to the nature of the pathophysiological knowledge mobilized to comprehend the case.
In Experiment 2, this assumption was directly tested by priming relevant pathophysiological
knowledge for either a short or a longer period, before enabling subjects to study the case briefly.
Free-recall data confirmed and extended the results of Experiment 1. Again, an intermediate
effect was found; this time, however, it was generated experimentally. The findings were inter-
preted in terms of qualitative differences in the nature of the knowledge structures underlying
performance between novices, advanced students, and medical experts: Experts use knowledge
in an encapsulated mode while comprehending a case, whereas students use elaborated knowledge.
The intermediate effect in clinical case representation
studies is among the best-known, stable, and hitherto un-
explained phenomena in medical expertise research. The
quasi-experimental paradigm that produces this phenom-
enon is described as follows: Subjects differing in level
of expertise are requested to study, for about 2 or 3 min,
half a page oftext describing a patient's history, present-
ing complaint and some additional findings such as re-
sults of laboratory tests and physical examination. The
text is removed, and the subjects are asked to recall every-
thing they can remember from the text. Subjects of inter-
mediate levels of expertise consistently produce more
elaborate recalls than either experts (e.g., experienced
physicians) or novices. This phenomenon has been dem-
onstrated under various conditions, with different cases
and in different populations (Claessen & Boshuizen, 1985;
Hassebrock, Bullemer, & Johnson, 1988; Muzzin, Nor-
man, Feightner, & Tugwell, 1983; Patel & Groen,
1986b). The intermediate effect has also been demon-
strated in expertise-related tasks other than text process-
ing (Grant & Marsden, 1988; Patel, Evans, & Kaufman,
1988).
These findings appear to be counterintuitive. Spilich,
Vesonder, Chiesi, and Voss (1979), for instance, have
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shown that subjects with a high knowledge of baseball
remembered more, and more relevant, information from
a report of a baseball game than low-knowledge individ-
uals. Theories of text processing, generally, assume that
prior knowledge facilitates new information to be encoded
and retrieved. The more prior knowledge a person has,
the more he/she will be able to recall from the stimulus
material (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Voss & Bisanz, 1985).
In other words, instead of the inverted U-shaped curve
commonly found in developmental studies in medicine,
one would expect a monotonically increasing recall func-
tion with increasing expertise.
In the present article, two experiments that were con-
ducted to find an explanation for this apparent paradox
will be reported. First however, clinical case representa-
tion studies relevant to the present perspective will be
briefly reviewed.
Representation of Clinical Cases
by Medical Students and Experts
Studies using free recall of meaningful texts assume that
the resulting data reflect the contents and the structure
of the mental representation of the original stimulus ma-
terial. The mental representation itself emerges from the
interaction of the stimulus material (e.g., a description
of a clinical case) and prior knowledge relevant to that
material. The input text activates prior knowledge, which
in tum provides meaning and structure to the incoming
information (Kintsch, 1988; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).
Kintsch and Greeno (1985) have introduced the term prob-
lem model to describe the mental representation originat-
ing from an attempt to comprehend and solve a problem.
It is assumed that the better the understanding of the per-
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son attempting to solve a particular problem, the more
elaborate and adequate the problem model will be. Since
experts have a far more elaborate knowledge base than
novices or intermediates do, one would expect their prob-
lem model, and hence their free recall of the problem,
to be more elaborate. This is essentially what has been
found in a number of domains, such as computer program-
ming (McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981;
Shneiderman, 1976), go (Reitman, 1976), football results
(Morris, Gruneberg, Sykes, & Merrick, 1981), mental
calculation (Hunter, 1962), and chess (Chase & Simon,
1973; de Groot, 1946). For instance, de Groot (1946) pre-
sented advanced chess players, masters and grand masters,
with midgame positions and required them to recall the
positions of the pieces on the board. He demonstrated that
accuracy and amount of recall was positively related to
level of expertise.
The first free-recall studies in medicine w,ere conducted
by Norman and his associates (Muzzin et al., 1983; Nor-
man, Jacoby, Feightner, & Campbell, 1979), who pre-
sented medical students and family physicians with short
written cases. The subjects were requested to study each
of these cases, to recall the information presented, and
to produce a diagnosis. In one study, in which the sub-
jects were requested to process four cardiorespiratory
cases, each within 45 sec, it was found that students in
residency training and third-year medical students showed
more recall than the physicians (Muzzin et al., 1983).
Claessen and Boshuizen (1985) presented cases of pan-
creatitis and prostatitis to family physicians and three
groups of students at different levels of expertise. Study
time was free. The residents participating in the experi-
ment showed superior recall on all cases as compared with
both the family physicians and the preclinical students.
Patel and Medley-Mark (1985) demonstrated the same
phenomenon in final-year medical students as compared
with both internists and novices, using an acute bacterial
endocarditis and a stomach cancer case, each studied for
about 2.5 min. Boshuizen (1989) presented two cases to
four groups of subjects-second-, fourth-, and fifth-year
medical students and family physicians. The cases were
presented in a sequential fashion and the subjects were
encouraged to think aloud while studying the patient in-
formation. Study time was free. For each of the cases,
she found a significant quadratic relationship between
level of expertise and free recall; the subjects of inter-
mediate levels recalled more information than both fam-
ily physicians and second-year students. Hassebrock et al.
(1988) presented advanced students, residents, and pedi-
atric cardiologists with two cases in pediatric cardiology,
not constraining study time. They failed to find differ-
ences in the immediate recall of the cases, however, after
a delay of 1 week, the cardiologists remembered signifi-
cantly less. Patel and Groen (1991) reviewed several
studies involving the comprehension of clinical cases by
subjects of different levels of expertise. In each of these
studies they found that intermediates recalled more infor-
mation than both novices and experts. Two other studies
failed to show significant differences in the recall of clin-
ical cases (Muzzin et al., 1982; Norman et al., 1979).
Thus, in contrast to studies from domains such as chess
or computer programming, clinical case recall studies
either demonstrate more elaborate recall by subjects of
intermediate levels of expertise, or fail to find significant
differences. Not only do these outcomes appear to be at
variance with general. models of text processing (e.g. ,
Graesser & Clark, 1985), they also contradict existing the-
ories of expertise in medicine. Lesgold and his associates
(Lesgold, 1984; Lesgold et al. ,1988), for instance, em-
phasize the determining role of causal, biomedical knowl-
edge in expert performance. They assume that experts in
the medical domain have acquired a more elaborate bio-
medical knowledge base, enabling them to perform bet-
ter than subexperts on diagnostic and other expertise-
related tasks, such as recognizing malignant structures on
X-rays (see also Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978). It
is difficult, however, to see how this conception of ex-
pertise in medicine could explain a decrease in recall of
clinical cases associated with an extension of the knowl-
edge structures assumed to be responsible for the recall
performance.
A recent reformulation of Van Dijk and Kintsch's
(1983) theory of text comprehension by Kintsch (1988)
may elucidate in more detail why current theories of text
processing have difficulty explaining this anomaly.
Kintsch's construction-integrationmodel deviates from ex-
isting schema-based conceptions of text comprehension
in that it conceptualizes the processing of text as largely
bottom-up. It assumes that knowledge is not prestored in
fixed structures, but is generated in the context ofthe task
for which it is needed. Knowledge about the world can
be conceived as an associative network of nodes and their
interrelations. When a reader attempts to understand a
text, words or phrases will activate their corresponding
nodes and activation will spread to other related nodes.
In this way, a pool of knowledge is activated that may
or may not be relevant to the task of understanding the
text at hand. Kintsch describes this as the "construction"
phase in text comprehension. Further reading, and hence
activation, of concepts and their interrelations will, how-
ever, constrain the meanings of what is previously read
by deactivating irrelevant knowledge. Thus, a coherent
representation of the text is formed, integrating knowl-
edge from earlier cycles of activation with that of later
cycles. In the course of this integration process, the reader
may have to produce bridging inferences and form mac-
ropropositions to create or maintain coherence. Prior
knowledge and information from the text itself thus be-
come integrated into a text base that represents the mean-
ing of that text. Extending Kintsch's argument, it seems
to be a reasonable assumption that the more prior knowl-
edge a person has, the less time is needed to construct
a coherent text base.' Experts can be expected to produce
less bridging inferences, simply because these are already
part of their knowledge base and will be generated auto-
matically. This would explain why experts are generally
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faster and more accurate in text-processing tasks related
to expertise (e.g., Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Spilich
et al., 1979). Because expertise transfers the advantage
of speed to processing, experts can be expected to pro-
duce more elaborate recalls than subjects of less advanced
levels of expertise. The notions proposed by Kintsch thus
leave unexplained why, compared with intermediates, ex-
perts in medicine, in fact, produce less elaborate case
recalls.
In an attempt to fit these findings to the Van Dijk and
Kintsch (1983) model, Groen and Patel (1988) assume
that subjects reading a text about a patient transform the
discourse into two different kinds of representations-
the textbase, which is the semantic representation of the
input, and a situation model, which is the cognitive rep-
resentation of the events, actions, persons, or the situa-
tion in general that the text is about. Groen and Patel sug-
gest that experts have better situation models than
intermediates do, enabling them to "filter out" irrelevant
information from a case. This filtering out would be
responsible for the fact that experts recall less informa-
tion; their situation models induce them to pay attention
only to cues that are critical to the situation and discard
others. However, the issue here is not so much that ex-
perts may filter out irrelevant information, but why they
are able to do so. That is, what kinds of changes occur
in the underlying knowledge base so that the representa-
tion of a clinical case becomes more condensed when ex-
pertise develops beyond the intermediate level?
Schmidt and Boshuizen (1992, in press; Boshuizen &
Schmidt, 1992) have proposed the idea of knowledge en-
capsulation to explain this phenomenon. Knowledge en-
capsulation is the subsumption, or "packaging," oflower
level detailed propositions, concepts, and their inter-
relations in an associative net under a smaller number of
higher level propositions with the same explanatory power.
They suggest that novices and intermediates process a clin-
ical case much in the way described by Kintsch (1988),
using increasingly detailed and elaborate biomedical
knowledge about the condition of the patient described.
This process is essentially bottom-up, so these groups con-
duct extensive search while interpreting the signs and
symptoms displayed in the story, leading to increases in
recall as a function of the growth of the knowledge base.
However, as more and more similar patients are seen,
certain shortcuts in their thinking begin to emerge. Sets
of detailed propositions originally activated while com-
prehending a case become encapsulated in concepts of
greater generality. Under the influence of experience,
subjects' elaborate knowledge of the world becomes
"chunked' into a limited number of highly inclusive con-
cepts that have the same explanatory power as the origi-
nal elaborate structure. In the case of medicine, the en-
capsulating concepts often tend to be of direct clinical
relevance.
Knowledge encapsulation was first observed in "think-
aloud" and pathophysiological explanation protocols of
medical experts. When asked to think aloud about a clin-
ical case, or to explain the phenomena observed in a case
in terms of their underlying structure, experts appear to
apply less biomedical knowledge than either intermedi-
ates or even novices. Boshuizen, Schmidt, and Coughlin
(1987), for instance, showed that general practitioners
rarely refer to biomedical concepts while reasoning about
a case, whereas students use biomedical concepts exten-
sively in the same situation. Patel, Evans, and Groen
(1989), who reviewed research on pathophysiological ex-
planations of clinical cases by subjects of different exper-
tise, also conclude that experts appear to rely less on
causal biomedical knowledge while diagnosing a case, and
tend to explain cases largely in terms of clinical knowl-
edge." Boshuizen and Schmidt (1992) have demonstrated
that biomedical knowledge is largely missing from experts
think-aloud protocols, not so much because this kind of
knowledge has become inert or inaccessible, but because,
through practice, biomedical concepts have become encap-
sulated into higher level concepts. Their findings suggest
that, as a result of the extended application of knowledge
in the comprehension of clinical cases, the granularity of
the concepts applied changes, with experts using more
global, comprehensive concepts than subjects of lower
levels of expertise. Hence, the development of expertise
seems to involve increased processing speed and further
expansion of the knowledge base as well as qualitative
shifts in the knowledge base itself. 3
If this analysis is correct, what are the implications for
case recall by experts? We hypothesize that encapsulation
of concepts in the knowledge base is directly associated
with encapsulation of related information in a text. Ex-
perts perceive and process individual signs and symptoms
as integrated wholes (for which they have encapsulating
concepts) and recall these encapsulating concepts rather
than the individual items themselves. For instance, if one
would require an internist to recall a patient history of
a toxic-looking drug addict who presents himself with high
fever, shaking chills, sweating, and feelings of prostra-
tion with some shortness of breath and a high pulse rate,
the internist would tend to process, and hence to recall,
this set of items as "patient has a septic condition. " "Sep-
tic condition" is an inference from the text that summa-
rizes or encapsulates these individual items. This would
explain why experts' recall is sparser than intermediates'
recall of a clinical case: Experts recall the case in encap-
sulated mode. In addition, it would explain why experts
produce more inferences in recall, although their overall
recall is less (Coughlin & Patel, 1986; Patel & Medley-
Mark, 1985). If we are correct, these inferences must be
encapsulations of the original text.
This theory explaining the origin of differences in prob-
lem representation between subjects of various levels of
expertise allows for a number of predictions that were
tested in Experiment 1:
1. If the construction and integration of biomedical
knowledge to understand the information embedded in a
case is more extensive than simply matching relevant
knowledge in encapsulated mode, intermediates may be
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expected to recall the case more extensively than experts.
This would explain the existence of intermediate effects.
2. The search for relevant concepts and the production
of bridging inferences to form a coherent representation,
however, takes more time than activating a relatively small
number of comprehensive, encapsulating concepts.
Hence, it is predicted that the intermediate effect will dis-
appear when processing time is restricted. Under these
conditions, students will be less able to form a coherent
text base. Experts encode sets of individual items in en-
capsulated mode without much search, so their recall will
be less affected by a reduction of processing time.
3. If experts represent case information in encapsulated
form, their recall will contain more comprehensive, high-
level inferences.
4. If intermediates usually process a case by activating
elaborate biomedical knowledge, whereas experts only ap-
ply encapsulated knowledge, then post hoc pathophysio-
logical explanations provided by intermediates will be
more extensive than those provided by experts.
5. This will only apply to those circumstances in which
subjects have sufficient time to use their pathophysiolog-
ical knowledge. If the time available is critical to the
search, activation, and processing of relevant knowledge,
a decrease in processing time will also affect the elaborate-
ness of pathophysiological explanations provided by in-
termediates. The amount of explanation provided by the
experts, however, will not be influenced by manipulation
of processing time, because their knowledge is encapsu-
lated and easily available.
6. Because of encapsulation, pathophysiological expla-
nations by experts will contain more comprehensive, high-
level propositions than those of intermediates.
In Experiment 1, these predictions were tested by re-
quiring subjects of different levels of expertise to study
a case history under varying time constraints, recall the
information, provide a diagnosis, and produce a patho-
physiological explanation for the signs and symptoms de-
scribed in the case.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 120 students and physicians of the
University of Limburg-24 first-year allied health sciences students
(the "laypersons" in the present study), 72 medical students (24
second-, 24 fourth- and 24 sixth-year undergraduate students)," and
24 internists with at least 2 years of experience. Each group of 24
was randomly subdivided into three groups of 8, studying the clin-
ical case under different time constraints. The subjects received a
small compensation for their participation.
Materials. The materials consisted of a booklet containing a 270-
word description of a clinical case and three blank response sheets.
The case was a Dutch translation of the acute bacterial endocardi-
tis case used by Patel and Groen (1986a) and consisted of71 propo-
sitions. The case is considered to be of intermediate difficulty, that
is, not entirely routine even for experts. In the Patel and Groen
study, for instance, six out of eight cardiologists produced an ac-
curate diagnosis. The original text of the case is provided in
Appendix A.
Procedure. The subjects were tested individually. First. they were
requested to study the case carefully. Depending on the experimental
condition, they were required to study the case for either 3 min
30 sec (3.5 min)-the amount of time allotted to the subjects in the
original Patel and Groen study-I min 15 sec (1.25 min), or 30 sec.
Before processing the case, the subjects in the 30-sec condition were
given the opportunity to read an unrelated text of exactly the same
length to provide them with some experience in scanning a text in
a very short time. This was done to minimize variability in the way
they would undertake the experimental task. After reading the text
for the duration of time allowed. the experimenter instructed them
to tum to the next page, which contained the following instructions:
"Please, write down everything you can recall from the case. Write
complete sentences and avoid abbreviations." On the next page,
the subjects were requested to provide a diagnosis for the patient.
The last page contained these instructions: "Describe the patho-
physiology which. in your opinion, underlies the case. Write com-
plete sentences and avoid abbreviations. Use schematic represen-
tations only if strictly necessary." The subjects were free to use
as much time as they needed for the assignments.
Analysis. The accuracy of the diagnosis was determined by at-
taching weights to each of the elements. If the diagnosis contained
the term "endocarditis," 2 points were given. The presence of
"acute," "bacterial," "emboli," or "contaminated needles" each
contributed I point. So, a maximum score of 6 could be obtained.
Both recall and pathophysiological explanation protocols were
segmented into propositions by using a technique adapted from
Kintsch (\974). The propositions consisted of two concepts con-
nected by a qualifier, such as "causation (cau) ," "negation (neg),"
"location (Ioc), " or "specification (spec)." For instance, the pro-
tocol fragment' '( ... ) The ictus is not displaced and a 2/6 diastolic
murmur is heard over the aortic valve ( ... )" consists of four propo-
sitions: I. ictus-neg (displaced); 2. murmur heard-Ioc (over the
aortic valve); 3. murmur-spec (2/6); and 4. murmur-spec (di-
astolic). For each proposition in the free recall, it was decided
whether it matched any proposition in the stimulus material. Infer-
ences were included in the analysis to the extent that they could
be matched to one or a combination of propositions in the original
text. Repetitions were removed. Interrater agreement for this pro-
cedure was 93 %. The total numbers of propositions found in free
recall and pathophysiology protocols were tallied.
In free recall, the evidence for encapsulation of signs and symp-
toms was explored by counting the number of high-level inferences
(Coughlin & Patel, 1986), which were inferences that summarized
at least two propositions from the text. This is a subset of the total
number of inferences produced. Inferences referring to only one
proposition in the text were excluded, because these could not be
considered encapsulations. To distinguish the former from infer-
ences based on only one proposition in the text, they will be fur-
ther referred to as summaries.
To test the hypothesis that the physicians' pathophysiology pro-
tocols contained knowledge in encapsulated mode, that is, contained
more comprehensive high-level propositions than those of the stu-
dents, additional analyses were carried out. Each of the proposi-
tions in the pathophysiology protocol was matched against a ca-
nonical explanation, provided in Appendix B. The canonical model
contains II highly encapsulating propositions, which constitute a
minimally sufficient explanation for all the signs and symptoms in
the endocarditis case." It was constructed with the support of two
internists familiar with the disease and its manifestations. Each of
the II explanatory concepts mentioned in the canonical model rep-
resent knowledge at a high level of encapsulation. The number of
propositions matching the model's propositions was counted. In-
terrater agreement was higher than 90 % for each of these pro-
cedures.
The data were analyzed using multivariate analyses of variance.
Polynomial contrast analyses were conducted to test for nonlinear-
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Figure 1. Average accuracy of diagnoses as a function of exper-
tise and processing time.
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Figure 2. Number of propositions recalled from the acute bac-
terial endocarditis case as a function of expertise and processing time.
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fects of expertise level on recall were significant [F(4,35)
= 5.64, MSe = 118.85, p < .001], with both a signifi-
cant linear and a quadratic component. Under the 1.25-
min processing condition, differences among expertise
levels were nonsignificant [F(4,35) = 2.18, MSe = 68.51,
P < .10). However, the 3O-sec processing condition again
displayed a significant effect of expertise on case recall
[F(4,35) = 4.81, MSe = 23.84, p < .01], with a signif-
icant linear component.
Pairwise comparisons within conditions show the fol-
lowing results: Under the 3.5-min processing time con-
dition, the three intermediate levels of expertise produced
significantly more propositions than the internists and the
health sciences students, nicely illustrating the existence
of an intermediate effect in these data. Among the groups
that were required to process the case in 1.25 min, only
the fourth- and sixth-year students produced significantly
more recall, indicating that the intermediate effect, al-
though still traceable, is less prominent. In the shortest
processing condition, the two highest levels of expertise
differed significantly from the other groups, but not from
each other.
In summary, as predicted, the emergence of the inter-
mediate effect appears to be dependent on the amount of
time available for processing clinical information. Given
a sufficiently short period of time, the phenomenon dis-
appears and the well-known increase in recall performance
as a function of expertise materializes (Chase & Simon,
1973; de Groot, 1946).6 It is interesting to note that dif-
ferences within levels of expertise as a result of differ-
ences in processing time were highly significant (all ps <
.00(1), with the exception of the internists [F(2,21) =
1.34, MSe = 80.43, p = .28]. These data suggest that,
in contrast to students of all levels of expertise, the per-
formance of experienced physicians is relatively insensi-
tive to manipulations of time, at least within the limits
of the present experiment.
Figure 3 displays the number of summaries found in
the free-recall protocols. Overall differences between
.. 3min30s
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Results
Diagnostic accuracy. Figure 1 shows the average ac-
curacies of the diagnoses proposed by the subjects. The
number of accurate diagnoses significantly covaried with
expertise, resulting in a monotonically increasing perfor-
mance curve [F(4,105) = 25.52, MSe = 1.46, p <
.000 I]. These data suggest that the case representation
task is ecologically valid, because the expected expertise-
related differences were actually found. Processing time
had an overall effect on diagnostic accuracy [F(2, 105) =
3.163, MSe = 1.46, p < .05]. None of the possible
within-group comparisons were statistically significant,
however, including expert performance [F(2,21) = 2.62,
MSe = 3.88, p < .10]. This may be due to a lack of sta-
tistical power, because each of the groups compared con-
sisted of only 8 subjects. As the average scores of the stu-
dent groups were low under all conditions, failure to find
significant differences within levels of expertise there may
be the result of the overall difficulty of the case.
Free recall. Figure 2 shows the results of the analyses
of the free-recall protocols. The number of propositions
recalled is displayed as a function of expertise and pro-
cessing time. Overall differences between levels of ex-
pertise were statistically significant [F(4,105) = 5.25,
MSe = 70.40, P < .(01). The relation between exper-
tise level and recall was nonlinear, with a significant qua-
dratic component [F(l,115) = 7.02, MSe = 167.50,p <
.01]. In other words, an inverted U-shaped curve pro-
vides the best fit to the data. In addition, processing time
had a significant effect on recall [F(2,105) = 68.26,
MSe = 70.40, P < .0001].
For the different processing conditions, the following
patterns emerge: In the 3.5-min processing condition, ef-
ity of the relations between the dependent variable and the subjects'
levels of expertise. This analysis calculates linear, quadratic, cubic,
and quartic terms in the between-groups variance. The predicted
inverted Uvshapein the recall data would result in significant devi-
ations from linearity and a significant quadratic term without sig-
nificant deviations.
51
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Figure 3. Number of high-level summaries produced as a func-
tion of expertise and processing time.
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Figure 4. Number of propositions found in the pathophysiology
protocols as a function of expertise and processing time.
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ical explanations than both novices and experts. Overall
differences were highly reliable, both within levels of the
experimental treatment and within each of the levels of
expertise. Exceptions were the sixth-year students [F(2,21)
= 2.28, MSe = 142.96, P < .13] and the internists
[F(2,21) = .40, MSe == 36.40, p < .67]. Among stu-
dents, constraining processing time generally caused a de-
crease in the number of propositions produced in the
pathophysiology protocols. Because the subjects were free
to use as much time as they needed to produce the pro-
tocols, these results strongly suggest that less extensive
activation of pathophysiological knowledge took place in
these groups while trying to understand the clinical case.
In many ways, the pathophysiology data are similar to
the free-recall data. An intermediate effect is present, and
processing time seems to have the same effect on
pathophysiological reasoning as it has on free recall. These
similarities indeed suggest that the intermediate effect in
free recall is the result of extensive activation and pro-
cessing of pathophysiological knowledge in the course of
understanding the case and that failure to do so results
in poor recall of the information embedded in that case.
Again, the physicians appear to be a separate case. Their
output was small and quite stable, irrespective of the con-
straints on processing time.
Finally, it was predicted that the physicians' patho-
physiology protocols would contain more propositions in
encapsulated mode than the students' groups, which would
explain why their explanations are more condensed than
those of students. To test this hypothesis, the contents of
these protocols were matched against the canonical model
described in Appendix B, which contains highly encap-
sulating explanatory propositions. If encapsulation is in-
deed a function of expertise, a linear trend is to be ex-
pected in the data. Figure 5 displays the average numbers
of matches between the canonical propositions and the
propositions found in the protocols.
Both expertise level and processing time were statisti-
cally significant [F(4,105) == 21.03, MSe = 2.26, P <
... JminlOs
... IminlSs
.. 30.
6th yr internists
Level of expertise
4th yrZnd yrHS
levels of expertise were again statistically significant
[F(4,105) == 25.862, MSe == .813, P < .00(1). Both a
linear and a quadratic model can adequately describe the
data [F(l,1l5) == 88.16, MSe == .72, P < .0001, and
F(l,115) == 20.99, MSe == .72,p < .0001, respectively].
Processing time had no significant effect on Humber of
summaries produced [F(2,105) == .63,MSe = .81,p <
.54]. Summaries were defined as inferences encapsulat-
ing two or more propositions appearing in the text, so
these data suggest that experts recall more information
from a text in encapsulated mode than subjects of lower
levels of expertise.
Pathophysiological explanation protocols. The as-
sumption was that intermediates and experts use function-
ally different knowledge while representing a clinical case.
According to Schmidt and Boshuizen (in press), intermedi-
ates process information by activating a rich base of
detailed causal pathophysiological knowledge, whereas
experts activate encapsulated knowledge. Assuming that
post hoc pathophysiological explanations reflect the
knowledge activated during the case processing task
(Groen & Patel, 1988), the intermediates' protocols will
be more extensive than those provided by the experts.
However, if the intermediates are hindered in activating
their knowledge by restricting the time needed to activate
relevant pathophysiological knowledge, information from
the case cannot properly be processed. Under the latter
condition, the elaborateness of post hoc explanation by
intermediates is expected to decrease, whereas patho-
physiological explanations provided by the experts-
originating from encapsulated knowledge and therefore
less extensive-will remain fixed. Figure 4 contains quan-
titative information concerning this assumption.
Both effects of level of expertise and processing time
were statistically significant [F(4,105) = 6.49, MSe ==
74.02, P < .0001, and F(2, 105) == 11.15, MSe = 74.02,
P < .0001, respectively]. The effect of expertise level
had a significant quadratic component [F( 1,115) = 19.03,
MSe == 89.01, P < .0001], indicating that subjects of in-
termediate levels produce more elaborate pathophysiolog-
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Figure 5. Number of encapsulating concepts found in the
pathophysiology protocols as a function of expertise and processing
time.
.0001 and F(2,105) = 4.72, MSe = 2.26, P < .01,
respectively]. No higher order trend was found, indicat-
ing that the number of encapsulating propositions pro-
duced linearly increased with expertise. (Hence, the bet-
ter performance of the sixth-year students in the 1.5-min
condition must be attributed to chance.) In summary, al-
though the total number of pathophysiological proposi-
tions produced by the experts was much lower than that
produced by the intermediates (as exemplified in Fig-
ure 4), the number of encapsulating propositions was
higher. These data suggest that the use of knowledge in
encapsulated form is indeed a function of expertise.
Discussion
The data presented support the notion proposed by
Schmidt and Boshuizen (in press) that students and ex-
perienced physicians represent clinical cases in different
ways because, in the process of understanding the text,
the groups use functionallydifferent knowledge. Provided
they have sufficient time, medical students seem to elabo-
rately process causal pathophysiological knowledge acti-
vated by cues embedded in the text in a bottom-upfashion,
trying to construct a more or less coherent text base
(Kintsch, 1988). By contrast, experienced physicians ac-
tivate only a few concepts relevant to understanding the
text. This would explain why advanced students recall
more information from a case than both experts and
novices, which accounts for the emergence of an inter-
mediate effect. This processing explanation of the inter-
mediate effect was further supported by the effects of time
constraints. As predicted, the intermediate effect disap-
peared when less time was available for processing. This
experimental manipulation greatly affected the perfor-
mance of novices and intermediates, whereas the experts'
recall was largely unaffected. Since activating relevant
concepts in encapsulated mode takes less time than con-
struction and integration ofa text base through activation
of detailed knowledge and extensive production of bridg-
ing inferences, the effects of time constraints on inter-
mediates, but not on experts, is easily interpreted. Finally,
although the experts' overall recall was less (in the 3.5-
min condition it was even less than the laypersons'), they
produced five times more summaries in their recall than
even the sixth-year medical students, suggesting that they
process the information in an encapsulated form. One in-
ternist, for instance, recalled the text as follows: "The
patient is a young man with a high fever, who presents
a septic syndrome. This suggestsdrug use. He shows signs
of thromboemboli, due to an affected heart valve. The
tachycardia fits with an associated aorta vitium [italics
added]." His protocol consists almost entirely of sum-
maries of the information actually presented in the text.
These summaries were defined as high-level inferences,
condensing many individual items from the text. For in-
stance, an inference such as "septic condition" in itself
subsumes 26 propositions from the endocarditis text. The
same applies to inferences such as "hemodynamic sta-
bility" and "aorta malfunction," often showing up in the
recall protocols. It is interesting to note that the same ter-
minology also often appears in the pathophysiological ex-
planations, indicating that experts tend to perceive, and
hence describe, the world in terms of its underlying struc-
ture rather than in terms of its surface characteristics, a
finding also reported by other investigators of expertise
development (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Chi et aI.,
1988).
The post hoc pathophysiology protocols were in line
with the predictions. If the subjects had had only limited
time to study the case, their post hoc pathophysiological
explanations of the signs and symptoms encountered
would be more restricted, simply because less pathophys-
iological knowledge was activated. The data generally
confirmed this hypothesis. The less time available for
studying the endocarditis case, the shorter the patho-
physiological explanations. In addition, an intermediate
effect related to level of expertise was found in the patho-
physiology data as well. Students of higher levels have
acquired more elaborate knowledge of pathophysiology
than students of lower levels or laypersons, hence their
pathophysiological explanations of the endocarditis case
are more extensive, more accurate, and are at a more
detailed level.
The performance of the internists was quite different.
Their pathophysiological explanations were short and in-
dependent of the amount of time provided for processing
the case. Boshuizen and Schmidt (1992) suggest that ex-
perts' knowledge of pathophysiology has become encap-
sulated as a result of practice-hence the short explana-
tion protocols. A direct assessment of the number of
encapsulating propositions used in the pathophysiology
protocols (Figure 5) confirmed this hypothesis. The
amount of encapsulation turned out to be a linear function
of experience. Two examples may illustrate the differ-
ences in pathophysiological explanations given by experts
and advanced students. Figure 6 displays a pathophys-
iological network constructed on the basis of the expla-
nation protocol of a fourth-year medical student in the 3.5-
min processing condition. The protocol consisted of 42
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Figure 6. Causal network of propositions derived from Intermedi-
ate 87-255's pathophysiological protocol. Dashed frames indicate con-
cepts in the pathophysiology protocols that were directly derived
from the endocarditis case. Solid frames indicate concepts that were
not. Note that each proposition in the network consists of two con-
cepts or nodes connected by a link or qualifier. These links could
be causal (cau), conditional (cond), temporal (temp), attributional
(att), or locational (lee). In addition, they could indicate that the
second node is a specification of the first (spec). Other qualifiers
are negation (neg), identity (iden), and class relation (isa).
propositions. Propositions can share arguments with other
propositions, so a protocol can be rewritten as an associa-
tive network. For instance, the first propositions of the
protocol of Intermediate 87-255 were: "Probably the
young man is an intravenous drug addict. He has also been
bitten by a cat. His resistance is not too good, so his im-
mune system has not been able to sufficiently eliminate
the bacteria which the cat has introduced into the man's
body by his bite." Figure 6 shows how these proposi-
tions were transformed into an associative network.
Inspection of Figure 6 reveals how the fourth-year stu-
dent tries to account for almost every sign and symptom
embedded in the text of the endocarditis case, suggesting
that extensive processing has taken place. Explanation is
at a detailed level; quite a few of the propositions include
basic physiological mechanisms.
Figure 7 displays the network representation of a ran-
domly selected protocol of an internist with II years of
experience. The contrast with the intermediate's network
is striking-l0 propositions were produced. These propo-
sitions include only a few cues provided by the case, and
the explanation is highly encapsulated. There is no refer-
ence to causative agents such as bacteria, or to mediating
processes such as sepsis. These seem to be encapsulated
in the few highly condensed concepts provided (e.g., en-
docarditis of the aortic valve) and their relationships. The
explanations provided by the other experts have essen-
tially the same structure.
So far, we have only been able to demonstrate that
changes in recall of a clinical case under various levels
of expertise and time constraints are associated with sim-
ilar patterns in the post hoc pathophysiological explana-
tions. The hypothesis as proposed, however, is a causal
one: Subjects of higher levels of expertise, especially
when they have sufficient time available, activate more
knowledge of pathophysiology in the process of compre-
hending the case. The extensiveness of their processing
determines the elaborateness of the case representation,
which in turn determines how much is recalled. This ex-
planation applies to novices and intermediates, but not to
experts, because their performance is less dependent on
extensive, detailed pathophysiological processing of the
case. However, if the processing of pathophysiological
knowledge is, indeed, causally responsible for the amount
of recall by novices and intermediates, it must be possi-
ble to experimentally generate an intermediate effect in
free recall by actively manipulating the extent of
pathophysiological processing. This was attempted in Ex-
periment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, the priming of prior knowledge para-
digm developed by Bransford and colleagues (e.g., Brans-
ford & Johnson, 1972; Franks, Bransford, & Auble,
1982) was used. In this experimental paradigm, prior
knowledge is either fully or partially activated; subse-
quently, subjects engage in a relevant criterial task. Dif-
ferences in performance, that is, differences in recall of
Figure 7. Causal network of propositions derived from Expert
8-623's pathophysiology protocol.
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Figure 9. Average number of propositions produced in the prim-
ing task.
Figure 8. Average accuracy of diagnoses as a function of exper-
tise and level of priming.
Results and Discussion
Diagnostic accuracy. Diagnostic performance was
again strongly related to expertise [F(4,90) = 22.878, MSe
= .69, p < .0001]. The amount of time available for ac-
tivation of prior knowledge had no influence on perfor-
mance. Figure 8 shows the average diagnostic accuracy
scores for each level of expertise and for the two treat-
ment conditions.
Activation of pathophysiological knowledge. Figure 9
displays the number of propositions produced by the stu-
dents and the physicians in response to the request that
they tell everything they knew about endocarditis. As was
expected, the subjects were able to produce more propo-
sitions when entitled to talk about the subject for 3.5 min
as compared with only 30 sec [F(l,90) = 168.506, MSe =
87.75, P < .0001].
These data illustrate that the experimental manipulation
was successful: The more time available, the more prior
knowledge was activated. In addition, an effect of exper-
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a text, can then be attributed to the nature and amount
of prior knowledge activated. In the present experiment,
subjects' knowledge of pathophysiology was primed by
having them recall whatever they knew about endocardi-
tis (the disease underlying the case used in Experiment 1)
for either 30 sec or 3.5 min. Subsequently, both groups
studied the endocarditis case for only 30 sec. If case re-
call depends on the amount of prior knowledge activated,
then differences in the activation time allotted will result
in recall differences. It was expected that students in the
3.5-min condition would recall more information from
the case than students in the 30-sec condition, although
case-processing time was constant for all the groups. Such
a finding would demonstrate that, for these levels of ex-
pertise, recall performance is indeed causally related to
the amount of activation of elaborate pathophysiological
knowledge, as was suggested by Experiment I. However,
because physicians are less dependent on extensive acti-
vation of pathophysiological knowledge to comprehend
and recall a case (simply because they operate upon struc-
tures that contain pathophysiological knowledge in encap-
sulated mode), one would expect them to recall less than
students. Consequently, an inverted Ll-shaped relation be-
tween expertise level and recall is expected; this time,
however, generated experimentally. In addition, the ex-
perts should be less affected by the experimental manip-
ulation. Such findings would further support the notion
that the intermediate effect in clinical case recall is in-
deed caused by the activation of elaborate, causal patho-
physiological knowledge by students of intermediate levels
of expertise. In addition, it would demonstrate that ex-
perienced physicians process clinical information using
knowledge structures distinctively different from those of
intermediates.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 20 first-year health sciences students
and 60 medical students-20 second-, 20 fourth-, and 20 sixth-year
undergraduate students. In addition, 20 internists participated in
the experiment.
Materials. The endocarditis case that was used in Experiment I
was used here as well.
Procedure. Each group was randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions. The subjects were tested individually. De-
pending on the condition, they were given the opportunity to acti-
vate their knowledge of endocarditis for either 3.5 min or 30 sec.
To check whether activation of prior knowledge took place in the
way intended, the sessions were audiotaped. After completing the
activation task, all the subjects were requested to study the acute
bacterial endocarditis case for 30 sec. (Prior to the experiment, the
subjects were given the opportunity to read an unrelated text of ex-
actly the same length to provide them with experience in scanning
a text in a very short time. This was done to minimize variation
in the way they would undertake the criterion task.) Subsequently,
they were asked to write down whatever information they recalled
from the case and to state a most likely diagnosis. The subjects were
free to use as much time as they needed for these assignments. The
verbatim transcripts of the activation task and the free-recall pro-
tocols were segmented into propositions in the same way as de-
scribed for Experiment I. The number of propositions produced
during priming of prior knowledge was counted. In addition, the
number of propositions correctly recalled from the case was estab-
lished.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Figure 10. Average number of propositions recalled from the en-
docarditis case under two levels of priming.
According to current theories of text processing (Graes-
ser & Clark, 1985; Kintsch, 1988; Voss & Bisanz, 1985),
processing of a clinical case by subjects of different levels
of expertise, and under various time constraints, would
produce two free-recall phenomena. The first would be
an increasing recall as a function of expertise; the second
would be a decrease in recall when time to study the case
becomes more restricted. The general idea here is that
reading the case induces the reader to build a cognitive
model of the situation to which the text is referring (Van
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The more knowledge relevant for
understanding the case the reader has, and the more time
for processing, the more comprehensive the mental rep-
resentation of the text will be. Since free recall reflects
this representation, one may predict that it would increase
with expertise and processing time. This prediction agrees
with findings in the general text-processing literature (e.g. ,
Spilich et aI., 1979) as well as with results of studies in
the field of expertise and its development (e.g., Chase
& Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1946).
The findings presented in this article, as well as those
of others (e.g., Hassebrock et al., 1988; Muzzin et aI.,
1983; Patel & Groen, 1991), are at variance with these
predictions. In Experiment I, the intermediate groups
generally recalled the case better than both experts and
novices. These results suggest that predictions derived
from theories of text comprehension can account for
novice and intermediate performance, but not for expert
recall of a clinical case.
In the introduction to this article, we proposed several
mechanisms that may explain these results. In line with
notions put forward by Kintsch (1988), it was assumed
that novices and intermediates, because they have no, or
only limited, knowledge fit to the task at hand, would pro-
cess a clinical case in a bottom-up fashion, extensively
activating prior knowledge to arrive at a more or less co-
herent representation of the case. It was conjectured that
such construction-integration processes would involve ex-
tensive inferencing and elaboration and would take con-
siderable time. Experts, on the other hand, may have
seen many patients with signs and symptoms similar to
the one presented and may have developed an appropri-
ate schema or situation model (Van Dijk & Kintsch,
1983; Groen & Patel, 1988) for the task at hand. We have
argued that the notion of processing guided by a situation
model is in itself insufficient to explain why the experts
recalled less information from the case. What must be ex-
plained is which structural characteristics enable a situa-
tion model to condense the information from a text. There-
fore, the idea of knowledge encapsulation was introduced.
Encapsulation was defined as the progressive subsump-
tion, or packaging, of lower level concepts and their re-
lations in an associative net under a limited number of
high-level concepts with the same explanatory power,
which results from repeated application of knowledge to
similar situations (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Schmidt
& Boshuizen, 1992, in press). Knowledge in encapsulated
mode would cause sets of individual items in a text to be
perceived as integrated wholes and would lead to process-
ing this information in an encapsulated format. This would
explain why experts' recall is sparse, contains many
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tise is demonstrated [F(3,90) = 9.168, MS. = 87.75, p>«:
.0001]; the internists generally produced more proposi-
tions in response to the priming task than the advanced
students. The latter, in turn, generated more knowledge
than the novices and laypersons.
Free recall. The prediction was that, among novices
and advanced students, the amount of relevant knowledge
activated by the priming procedure would influence the
comprehension of the clinical case and, hence, its recall.
Figure to displays the average number of propositions
recalled from the endocarditis case when it was subse-
quently presented to all the subjects for 30 sec.
The free-recall data demonstrate both an effect of prior
activation [F(l,90) = 13.37, MS. = 21.36, p < .001]
and an effect of expertise [F(4,90) = 8.87, MS. = 21.36,
p < .0001]. Although all the subjects had only 30 sec
to process the case, those who had less opportunity to ac-
tivate relevant knowledge in advance recalled significantly
less from the endocarditis case. Exceptions were the in-
ternists [F(l, 18) = .11, MS. = 21.92, p < .75] and the
health sciences students [F(I,18) = 1.77, MS. = 13.71,
p < .21]. More important, the data display an intermedi-
ate effect, because the effect of expertise on case recall
shows a significant quadratic component [F(l,95) =
20.3533, MS. = 24.15, p < .0001] without significant
deviations. Thus, the more advanced students recalled
more than both the novices and the experts. As predicted,
the priming of prior pathophysiological knowledge had
its largest impact on case processing by the students of
intermediate levels of expertise, whereas the experts' per-
formances were not affected. These data provide unequiv-
ocal evidence for the notion that intermediates' compre-
hension of a clinical case is driven by detailed
pathophysiological knowledge, while experts' understand-
ing is independent of elaborate processing of this kind.
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knowledge-based inferences, and is independent of time
constraints on processing. Both recall and pathophysiol-
ogy data supported the hypothesis that experts use knowl-
edge in encapsulated mode. Experts recalled the case
mainly using concepts not found in the text itself, but sub-
suming most of the information from that text. In addi-
tion, their pathophysiological explanations, although also
sparse, contained more encapsulating concepts than those
of the students.
Experiment 2, in addition, demonstrated that, among
students, the free recall of a clinical case is indeed causally
determined by the amount of activation of knowledge of
pathophysiology, whereas among clinicians it is not.
Based on the notions outlined in this article, we were able
to experimentally generate an intermediate effect in the
recall of a case by manipulating the amount of activation
of underlying pathophysiological knowledge. Whereas the
students were greatly affected by the conditions of the ex-
periment, the internists processed the patient information
largely unaffected by the priming event. Even when the
experts were forced to activate knowledge at a detailed
level, this knowledge did not affect their comprehension
of the clinical case. These findings indicate that the in-
ternists superior diagnostic performance cannot be ex-
plained by more extensive pathophysiological processing
of a case, as is suggested elsewhere (e.g., Lesgold, 1984),
but is based on knowledge structures qualitatively differ-
ent from those of advanced students.
Several objections may be raised against the findings
presented here. The first is that intermediate effects may
have occurred not because the intermediates and the ex-
perts employed qualitatively different knowledge while
processing the case, but because they employed different
strategies (Norman, Brooks, & Allen, 1989). For in-
stance, if the intermediates attempted to simply learn the
material presented by heart, whereas the experts processed
the case in a meaningful way, this may result in more
elaborate free recall by the intermediates, particularly
when they had sufficient time to do so. There are several
reasons why such differences in processing strategy are
unlikely. First, the subjects were not aware beforehand
that they would be requested to recall the case. Experi-
ment 1 was presented to them as a diagnostic task, so re-
call can thus be considered a by-product of an attempt
to understand the cause of the signs and symptoms pre-
sented in the text. Second, a learning-by-heart explana-
tion would render the post hoc pathophysiological data
meaningless. If the students did not activate pathophysio-
logical explanations in the course of processing the case,
but just learned the text in a rote-memorization fashion,
then where do these differences in pathophysiological ex-
planations related to expertise and processing time come
from? And third, a rote-memorization hypothesis certainly
cannot account for the results of Experiment 2, because
all the groups in this experiment had only 30 sec to study
the endocarditis case.
A second objection may be that the data represent a case
of output editing, that is, the experts were less motivated
to comply with the requirements of the experiments than
the students and, therefore, produced shorter protocols.
However, this is unlikely, because in Experiment 2, the
experts, when asked to state everything they knew about
endocarditis, produced, in fact, longer protocols. There
is, therefore, no particular reason to believe that the ex-
perts were less motivated than the other subjects. A fur-
ther possibility is that experts are trained in a kind of short-
hand to represent cases, whereas students are not. This
is a more serious option, because physicians regularly re-
port about the patients they see, whereas students do not
have the same experience to the same extent. However,
intermediate effects have been reported under conditions
in which no post hoc recall was required, and hence no
possibility for output editing (Grant & Marsden, 1988;
Patel et al., 1988; Patel & Groen, 1991). In addition, phy-
sicians' protocols are not only shorter, but also different
in terms of their content. There is no particular reason
to assume that differences in the concepts used for recall-
ing and explaining cases do not reflect differences in the
structure underlying performance.
A final objection that may be raised is that free recall
may not reflect the problem representation in the medi-
cal domain to the same extent that it does in other do-
mains such as chess or computer programming, because
its results are so different from the results from these other
domains (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Shneiderman,
1976). This issue has troubled many investigators con-
fronted with data similar to ours (e.g., Norman et aI.,
1989). The present experiments suggest, however, that
free recall is a meaningful indicator of the problem rep-
resentation resulting from attempts to comprehend a case.
The present studies have demonstrated that it is possible
to replicate the findings of de Groot (1946), Chase and
Simon (1973), and others in the medical domain, provided
that processing time is sufficiently short. The results ac-
quired under the 30-sec processing condition in Experi-
ment 1 illustrate this position. However, the relationship
between prior knowledge of a domain and problem rep-
resentation in that domain may not be as straightforward
as has been assumed in previous studies. If the develop-
ment of expertise involves not only quantitative growth
of knowledge, but also qualitative shifts, as is suggested
by some (e.g., Feltovich, Johnson, Moller, & Swanson,
1984) and demonstrated in the present experiments, then
representation of problems by subjects at different stages
of development will tend to reflect these shifts.
A few concluding remarks regarding knowledge encap-
sulation follow. Encapsulation should not be conceptual-
ized as a permanent condition of the experts' knowledge
base, but rather as just one of the possible forms in which
knowledge may present itself. This idea fits well with
Kintsch's assumption that knowledge organizes itself de-
pending on the task at hand. If the task is understanding
or explaining some well-known or routine aspect of the
world, knowledge in encapsulated mode will do. Other
tasks, for instance, the solving of unfamiliar problems or
the requirement to state everything one knows about a
topic, may call for the activation of knowledge in its
elaborate form. In Experiment 2, it was demonstrated that
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the experts, when explicitly asked, produced more detailed
knowledge about endocarditis than both advanced students
and novices. Boshuizen (1989) found similar evidence of
"unfolding" of previously encapsulated knowledge. Patel,
Groen, and Arocha (1991) provide data that could also
be interpreted as evidence for task-dependent knowledge
unfolding. They presented medical experts with cases
within and outside their immediate domain of expertise
and required them to explain these cases in terms of their
underlying pathophysiology. The resulting explanation
protocols of cases outside the domain were longer, more
detailed, and contained more biomedical concepts, sug-
gesting that the experts more extensively activated knowl-
edge when confronted with nonroutine problems.
Encapsulation does not necessarily need to be confined
to domains such as medicine. It may well be possible that
encapsulation in the knowledge base is responsible for
shortcut phenomena in other domains as well, in particu-
lar, the chunking of information that is typically observed
in grand masters in chess (Chase & Simon, 1973), and
"step skipping" by experts in geometry problem-solving
(Koedinger & Anderson, 1990).
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NOTES
I. These consequences of Kintsch' s (1988) model for expertise de-
velopment have to be inferred, because Kintsch does not address the
issue of novice-expert differences in text processing.
2. A distinction is made here between clinical and biomedical knowl-
edge. Clinical knowledge is defined as knowledge of the attributes of
sick people. It refers to the ways in which a disease can manifest itself
in patients, the kind of complaints one would expect given that disease,
the nature and variability of the signs and symptoms, and the ways in
which the disease can be managed. Biomedical, or pathophysiological
knowledge, by contrast, refers to the pathological principles, mecha-
nisms, or processes underlying the manifestationsof disease. It is phrased
in terms of entities such as viruses or bacteria, and in terms of tissue,
organs, organ systems, or bodily functions.
3. Knowledge encapsulation has features in common with two other
knowledge-"packaging". cognitive processes described in the literature.
Anderson's (1983, 1987) ACT theory assumes that, with practice,
procedural knowledge, expressed as a set of productions, collapses into
a fewer number of more comprehensive productions. This process is
called knowledge compilation. A similar learning mechanism, called
chunking; is described by Newell and Rosenbloom (1981). According
to Newell, Rosenbloom, and Laird (1989), both compilation and chunk-
ing serve the purpose of tuning the knowledge base, that is, generaliz-
ing or specializing productions. However, whereas knowledge compi-
lation and chunking result from the reduction of a set of productions
in a procedural knowledge base into a smaller number of more encom-
passing ones, encapsulation operates merely upon the declarative knowl-
edge base, gradually reducing, through practice, molecular concepts and
their interrelations to a smaller set of molar ones.
4. In contrast to the situation in the USA, Dutch medical students follow
a 6-year undergraduate program.
5. In plain English, the following explanation applies to the case: The
young man is probably a drug addict who has used a contaminated
syringe. Bacteria have caused a sepsis, to which the body responds with
fever. The sepsis condition is responsible for the development of an en-
docarditis, which is a vegetation or abscess on the aortic valve. This
causes aortic insufficiency and thromboembolies. The disease is par-
ticularly acute in this patient because he has a decreased bodily resistance
as a result of his drug use. The loss of vision and the erythrocytes in
his urine are the visible symptoms of the thrombo-embolies, while the
low blood pressure, the diastolic murmur, the shortness of breath, and
the high pulse rate can be attributed to the aortic insufficiency. Most
other symptoms are fever-related. The story of the cat bite is probably
a cover-up for the puncture wounds in his left arm.
6. These data seem to explain why an intermediate effect was not dem-
onstrated in all recall studies reviewed in the introduction (e.g., Muz-
zin et aI., 1982; Norman et aI., 1979). In these particular studies, pro-
cessing time was limited. As is demonstrated by the present experiment,
the emergence of an intermediate effect depends on the amount of time
available for processing.
APPENDIX A
Text of the Acute Bacterial Endocarditis Case
(Patel & Groen, 1986a, p. 97)
A 27-year-old unemployed male was admitted to the emer-
gency room. He complained of shaking chills and fever of 4 days
duration. He took his own temperature and it was recorded at
40 0 C on the morning of his admission. The fever and chills were
accompanied by sweating and a feeling of prostration. He also
complained of some shortness of breath when he tried to climb
the two flights of stairs in his apartment. The patient volunteered
that he had been bitten by a cat at a friend's house a week be-
fore admission.
Functional inquiry revealed a transient loss of vision in his
right eye, which lasted approximately 45 seconds. This he de-
scribed the day before admission to the emergency ward.
Physical examination revealed a toxic-looking young man who
was havinga rigor. His temperature was 41 0 C. Pulse was 124
per minute. BP 110/40. Mucous membranes were clear. Ex-
amination of his limbs showed puncture wounds in his left ante-
cubital fossa. There were no other skin findings.
Examination showed no jugular venous distention. Pulse was
regular, equal and synchronous. The pulse was also noted to be
collapsing. The apex beat was not displaced. Auscultation of his
heart revealed a 2/6 early diastolic murmur in the aortic area.
Funduscopy revealed a flame shaped hemorrhage in the left eye.
There was no splenomegaly. Urinalysis showed numerous red
cells. There were no red cell casts on microscopic urinalysis.
(From "Knowledge-based solution strategies in medical reason-
ing" by V. L. Patel and G. 1. Groen, 1986, Cognitive Science,
10,91-116. Copyright 1986 by Ablex Publishing. Reprinted by
permission. )
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APPENDIX B
Canonical Explanation for the Endocarditis Case
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Note-The concepts enclosed by solid frames, and their interrelations, constitute the minimally sufficient canonical explanation. Dashed frames
contain the signs and symptoms displayed in the endocarditis case explained by the model. For an explanation of the meaning of the links between
concepts, see the caption for Figure 6.
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